Trust in Signals and the Origins of Disagreement


Ing-Haw Cheng and Alice Hsiaw

Discussion by Savitar Sundaresan Imperial College


March 2, 2019




- Question: Why do agents interpret the same information differently?
- Theoretical Innovation: 'Pre-screening'
 - Agents assess source-credibility first.
 - Only update beliefs afterwards.
- Findings: Sensitivity to data depending on order
 - Can generate excessive speculative trade, bubbles and crashes





Omparison to two other mechanisms in the literature





Truth



















































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
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- If identical ex-ante beliefs, need different signal orders.

Alternative 1: The Fragility of Asymptotic Agreement




This paper

Alternative 1: The Fragility of Asymptotic Agreement



Acemoglu, Chernozhukov, and Yildiz (2016)


Alternative 2: Inattention




Nimark and Sundaresan (2018)

- Need ex-ante identical agents
- Need two different sources of identical quality
- Need agents to see same (but not infinite) signals
- Need them to see signals in different order
- Need them to not learn from each other
- So when do results actually hold?

Comments



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• Optimal pre-screening conditions exist in limit.

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- But why bubbles?



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Behavioral Bias + Limits to Arbitrage = Equilibrium Pricing Error

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Behavioral Bias + Limits to Arbitrage = Equilibrium Pricing Error

Biases

- overconfidence
- sentiment
- extrapolation
- etc...
- Constraints
 - margin
 - short horizons
 - short sale constraints
 - etc...



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 - Persistence and asymmetry
 - Disconfirming signals and asymmetry?

- Too many propositions!
- Not enough discussion about some of them.
- Too many anecdotes/examples/justifications
- Burn in period why not just different priors
- Define measure of disagreement clearly see Zanardo (2017)

- Interesting, and to my knowledge, novel theoretical mechanism!
- I think the non-comparison results are the most interesting!
- In need of the right motivating example.